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Abstract 
 
The EU constitutes a supranational policy-making jurisdiction that 
has moved decisively into the maritime transport policy field. A vari-
ety of maritime interests has identified a new level of power with the 
EU decision-making process and has re-targeted its lobbying strate-
gies in order to influence the Common Maritime Transport Policy 
(CMTP). This article examines the patterns and the capabilities of 
this mobilisation. The first  part focuses  on  the  structures of these 
Euro-groups. Then, the analysis turns on the lobbying practices of 
these interests groups in the context of the EU co-decision process of 
policy-making. The final part weighs the extent that the ‘EU environ-
ment’ and the ‘economic environment’ assist, or undermine, the gov-
ernability of these lobbying activities and their capacity to be coherent 
policy actors that serve the interests of their members in the long-term. 
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1.  Introduction 
 
Since 1974 the European Union (EU) has attempted to develop a 
Common Maritime Transport Policy (CMTP). In recent years, the 
scope and depth of this policy have widened and discussions have 
shifted  from  the  minimalist  approach,  which  did  not  endorse the 
need  for  common  initiatives,  to  an  approach  that  considers 
comprehensive EU policies. A variety of stakeholders has identified 
a  new  level  of  power,  and  has  formed  EU-level  interest  groups 
seeking  to  ‘shoot  where  the  ducks  are’  (Mazey  and  Richardson 
1996)  and  influence  ‘what’,  ‘how’,  and  ‘when’  will  be  changed. 
This  led  the  European  Commission  (1991)  to  institutionalise  the 
participation of organised maritime interests, via the creation of a 
Maritime Industries Forum in 1992.  
 
Grounding on the role of these private policy actors in the CMTP 
making, and the questions generated by the cross-sectoral variance 
of  interests  representation  in  the  EU  (Section  2),  this  paper  re-
searches the patterns and the capabilities of the observed maritime 
interests mobilisation. First, it analyses the structures of maritime 
interests (membership numbers and types, location, internal struc-
tures and budget), aiming to conclude on whether the maritime sec-
tor is a unique case insofar as EU interests representation is con-
cerned (Section 3). Then the paper focuses on the endorsed lobby-
ing practices, in the context of the EU co-decision process of policy 
making (Section 4). Finally, it assesses their ability to become co-
herent policy actors and develop activities that serve the interests of 
their  members  in the CMTP  making (Section 5). The analysis  is 
based on a data-set of replies to a questionnaire that has been dis-
tributed to all the interest groups that are either members of the MIF, 
or are listed in relevant directories.  
 
 
2.  The Research Question 
 
Since its creation the EU is characterised by a sui generis pattern of 
decision-making procedures that contributes to a Euro-centred for-
mat  of  interest  representation.  The  number  of  EU-level  interest 
groups augmented in the 1990s, as the Single European Act (1987) 
increased  the  EU  competence  and  introduced  qualified  majority 8  European Political Economy Review  
 
vote as normal practice for policy decisions, and the Treaty of Am-
sterdam (1997) expanded the application of the co-decision process, 
increasing the role of the European Parliament (EP) in various pol-
icy areas, including maritime transport.  
 
Explaining  this  institutional  context,  contemporary  studies  of  the 
EU policy-making –– irrespective of whether they define the EU as 
a liberal intergovernmental experiment (Moravcsik 1998), a distinc-
tive west European effort to contain the consequences of globalisa-
tion (Wallace and Wallace 2000), a polity-like system (Richardson, 
1996),  a  regulatory  state  (Mahone  1997),  a  system  of  multi-
governance (Marks et al 1996), or a political system close to post-
pluralism (Hix 1999) - suggest that the input of private actors in 
sectoral EU policies cannot be ignored. 
 
The CMTP is one of these sectoral policies. Its basis is Article 84(2) 
of the Rome Treaty. Following a lengthy period of inertia that lasted 
almost three decadew, the adoption of  four Regulations targeting 
the improvement of the EU-flagged fleet’s competitiveness (1986) 
marked the starting point of the systematic EU involvement in mari-
time affairs (Power 1992). In 1991 the EU adopted a ‘horizontal ap-
proach’ (European Commission 1991) which has contributed, along 
with the progress of European integration, to the replacement of the 
ad hoc crisis interventions by an all-embracing CMTP attempting to 
address the totality of the sector’s problems. Since 1997, the appli-
cation of the co-decision method has increased role of the EP in de-
termining  CMTP  outcomes  -  a  role  that  is  as  important  as  the 
Commission’s role in setting the agenda and putting forward policy 
proposals. 
 
Yet the EU policy-making has not necessarily produced collective 
policy  outcomes.  It  took  seven  years  (1985-92)  for  a  Council 
agreement on cabotage liberalisation. In the absence of a common 
ground the Commission had to withdraw (1996) its 1989 proposal 
for a European Registry of Shipping. In 2006 the EP voted for a 
second time against a directive aiming to liberalise port services.  
 
The presence of maritime interest groups and their contribution to 
bringing about and solving controversies, or defining CMTP details 
are well documented. Even in the late 1980s, when scholars con-Pallis: Maritime Interest Representation  9 
ceived, either explicitly (Cafruny 1991; Bredima-Savopoulou 1990) 
or implicitly (Tzoannos 1989, Hart et al 1993), the EU as an inter-
governmental organisation defined  by  member states preferences, 
the political power of shipping interests was acknowledged as the 
origin of domestic pressures and a major influence on the political 
will to achieve collective agreements.  
 
The actions of elite non-governmental interest groups play a major 
role in regulating shipping, as a competitive pluralistic lobbying en-
vironment has emerged over the course of the 1980s in which the 
interests of shipowners, consumers, and labour were represented at 
the peak level albeit not equally effectively (Aspinwall 1995). The 
search for a EU port policy is also marked by the conflicts between 
contending  interest  groups  (Pallis  1997;  Chlomoudis  and  Pallis 
2002).  The  CMTP  developments  are  the  outcome  of  a  process 
wherein organised interests with various capacities, EU institutions, 
and member states are ‘autonomous yet interdependent’ actors in-
volved in a triangular relationship (Pallis 2002; Stevens 2003). Each 
one strengthens its bargaining position against the other by referring 
to its relationships to the third. The hunt for a balance that advances 
policy responses to the changing economic environment, intensify 
exchanges and the search for ‘winning’ coalitions (also: Selkou and 
Roe 2004).  
 
The observed inequality of the input of the contending maritime in-
terests  in  this  multi-dimensional  EU  policy-making  game,  can 
partly be explained by the limits posed by the economic environ-
ment (i.e. shipowners enjoy the ability of asset mobility).  
 
However, the relative powers of the mobilised maritime  interests 
also depend on the organisation, the lobbying practices and the gov-
ernability  of  the  Euro-level  interest  groups.  As  there  is  not  an 
autonomous  public  clearly  defined  decision-making  but  a  policy 
arena where power is fragmented, interest groups have a number of 
access  points  in  the  unregulated  Brussels  game  and  might  adopt 
various strategies for the successful pursuit of their interests.   
 
Hence,  several  studies  observe  major  cross-sectoral  or  cross-
industry  variations  in  both  organisation  and  methods  of  interests 
representation (Greenwood and Aspinwall, 1998; Greenwood 2003; 10  European Political Economy Review  
 
Mazey and Richardson 2003). There is neither a dominant model of 
EU interest group nor a static relationship between interest groups 
and EU institutions. Membership, resources, status, capacities and 
influence vary. Still, the knowledge on the patterns of interests or-
ganisation in the maritime case, both regarding the structures and 
the lobbying practices observed is limited. The next section exam-
ines whether these patterns differ from the most common practices 
of EU-level interests representation.  
 
An additional research question relates to the ability of maritime in-
terest groups to be ‘governable’. This capacity stands as a condition 
to promote their interest representation strategies and serve the in-
terest of their members in the long-term.  The key output in terms of 
effective representation is a significant influence on developments 
at European level. But this output is almost impossible to measure 
and might not be evident until years later.  So, effectiveness is gen-
erally measured in terms of three key inputs (Boleat 2002): an ef-
fective intelligence mechanism, so that the association knows what 
is going on in Brussels; top quality policy representations; and lob-
bying ability. The first one depends on the resources that an interest 
group has available. The other two are largely dependent on the co-
hesiveness of interest groups. The ability of some groups to be co-
hesive when acting within this system has often been questioned, 
leading to reports about ‘economic giants but political dwarfs’ that 
are often unable to state their interests in a changing environment 
due to the obstacles that complicate the identification of these inter-
ests  (Grossman  2004).  For  these  reasons  this  research  assesses 
which different factors of the ‘EU environment’, and the ‘economic 
environment’,  facilitate  or  impede  the  governability  of  EU  level 
maritime interests organisations. 
 
 
3.  Contending Maritime Interest Groups  
 
Today, there are 37 groups representing maritime interests (Table 
1).  The  majority  of  them  are  business  associations  (30  interest 
groups –82%), with the rest being either trade unions (4–10%), or 
organisations representing regional maritime interests (3–8%). Four 
of  these  interest  groups  represent  interests  that  are  collectively Pallis: Maritime Interest Representation  11 
associated at an international level and acknowledge the need to a 
more cohesive European sub-committee. 
 
European shipowners were among the first market players to form 
in 1962 an association based on EU membership, the Comité des 
Associations  d’Armateurs  du  Marché  Communautaire.  Following 
the first EU enlargement (1973) its secretariat moved from Paris to 
Brussels  and  adopted the  English  version  of  its  name  (European 
Community  Shipowners’  Association-ECSA).  ECSA  keeps  up  a 
long  shipowners’  tradition  that  combines  collective  interests 
representation (the International Chamber of Shipping was founded in 
1921)  but  individualistic  secrecy  regarding  commercial  practices 
(Ronit  1995).  A  major  development occurred  in  1993,  when  the 
European  Liner  Affairs  Association  (ELAA)  was  established  to 
represent  the  world’s  liner  shipping  industry’s  interest.  Cruise 
companies also expressed an interest to establish a pan-European 
interest  group,  in  order  to  lobby  for  (de)regulatory  reforms,  a 
restructuring of interest representation that is explicitly grounded on 
the progress of integration and the expansion of the EU membership 
(Lekakou et al 2004). 
 
The International Transport workers Federation (ITF) was among 
the first trade unions to lobby EU authorities. In the late 1990s they 
developed  a  European  section  (ETF).  The  European  Shippers 
Council (ESC) was also formed as early as 1963, with a mission to 
coordinate  shippers’  commercial  activities  vis-à-vis  liner  lines. 
Eventually, it turned to a group representing interests before moving 
to  Brussels  in  1993.  Port  authorities,  port  operators,  freight 
forwarders  and  other  industries  came  to  the  scene  later,  as  they 
established their EU interest groups the late 1980s or early 1990s. 
 
Euro-federations  having  a  membership  constituency  of  national 
associations are the favour format of maritime EU interest groups 
(26 interest groups –68%). This leads to membership closely related 
to the number of the maritime EU member-states. Still, these groups 
admit  non-EU  members,  in  the  majority  federations  of  maritime 
nations  which  are  perspective  EU  member  states  or  associated 
countries.  The  second  most  preferred  format  is  ‘direct  firm 
membership’  (7-21%),  followed  by  mixed  half-way  house 
structures  which  admit  both  associations  and  direct  firm 12  European Political Economy Review  
 
membership  (4–11%).    This  pattern  is  not  surprising  as  Euro-
federations are historically the most likely to be consulted by the 
EU  institutions  (Butt  Philip  1985;  Mazey  and  Richardson  1993), 
while offering opportunities to gather consistent reliable sources of 
information and maintain network contacts. 
 
Table 1: Maritime interest groups in the EU policy-making 
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1.  AMSI (Association of Marine Scientific 
Industries)  
ba  dfm  4  17 EU 
1 non-EU 
2.  CEMT (Confederation of European 
Maritime Technology Societies)  ba  f  8  9 EU 
3.  CESA (Community of European 
Shipyards Association)  ba  f  12  12 EU 
2 non-EU 
4.  CLECAT (Liaison Committee of 
European Forwarders)  ba  f  14  21 EU 
5 non-EU 
5.  EBA (European Boating Association)  ba  f  14  22 EU 
4 non-EU 
6.  EBU (European Barge Union)  ba  f  7  9 EU 
7.  ECASBA (EC Association of Ship 
Brokers & Agents)  ba  f  20  21 EU 
1 non-EU 
8.  ECSA (European Community 
Shipowners Association)  ba  f  15  15 EU 
1 non-EU 
9.  EIA (European Intermodal Association)  ba  dfm  20  81 EU 
4 non-EU 
10.  EMEC (European Marine Equipment 
Council)  ba  f  8  10 EU 
2 non-EU 
11.  ESC (European Shippers Council)  ba  f  9  9 EU 
3 non-EU 
12.  ESPO (European SeaPort Organisation)  ba  f  20  20 EU 
3 non-EU 
13.  EUDA (European Dredging 
Association)  ba  dfm  9  11 EU 
9 non-EU 
14.  EUROGIF (European Oil & Gas 
Innovation Forum)  ba  m  5  10 EU 
5 non-EU 
15.  FEPORT (Federation of European Ports 
Private Operators)  ba  f  13  13 EU 
16.  CRPM (Conference of Peripheral 
Maritime Regions)   r  f  20  15 EU 
6 non-EU 
17.  HELCOM (Baltic Marine Environment 
Protection Com)  r  f  8  8 EU 
1 non-EU 
18.  EHMC (European Harbour Masters 
Committee)  tu  f  19  94 EU 
15 non-EU 
19.  ETF (European Transport workers 
Federation)  tu  f  25  215 EU 
15 non-EU Pallis: Maritime Interest Representation  13 
20.  ELAA (European Liner Affairs 
Association)  ba  dfm  24  24 companies 
21.  OCEAN (Organisation of European 
Community Ship Suppliers) 
ba  F  12  12 EU 
1 non-EU 
22.  FEMAS (Federation of European 
Maritime Associations of Surveyors and 
Consultants) 
ba  f  8  9 EU 
23.  INE (Inland Navigation Europe)  ba  m  6  6 EU 
24.  EFIP (European Federation of Inland 
Ports)  ba  m  11  17 EU 
8 non-EU 
25.  EUROPIA (European Petroleum 
Industry Association)  ba  dfm  0  20 multination-
als 
26.  FEAP (Federation of European 
Aquaculture Producers)  ba  f  20  19 EU 
2 non-EU 
27.  EURMIG (European Recreational 
Marine Industry Group)  ba  F  16  sca 
28.  EURACS (European Association of 
Classification Societies)  ba  dfm  3  sca 
29.  IIMS(EG) (International Institute of 
Marine Surveyors)  ba  dfm  na  sca 
30.  EMPA (European Maritime Pilots 
Association)  tu  f  na  na 
31.  EMF (European Metalworkers 
Federation)  tu  f  na  65 members 
32.  AMRIE (Alliance of Maritime Regions 
in Europe)  r  m  11  44 EU 
33.  ETA (European Tug Operators)  ba  f  na  na 
34.  ETTC (European Towing Tank 
Community)  ba  m  na  na 
35.  EAFPO (European Association of Fish 
Producer Organisations)  ba  f  na  na 
36.  EUROPECHE (Association of National 
Organisations of Fishing Enterprises)  ba  f  na  na 
37.  IAMI (EU) (Organisation of Maritime 
Institutes of the EU)  ba  dfm  na  na 
Notes:  ba=business  association;  tu=trade  union;  r=regional  interests;  dfm=direct  firm 
membership; f=federation; m=mixed; sca=sub-committee of international association.  
The first 19 listed interest groups participated in the study. 
 
 
3.1  Location, Secretariat, Internal structures, Resources  
 
Brussels is the preferred location of 55% of the EU maritime inter-
est groups for which data are available (Table 2). With the Belgian 
capital  being the  most obvious preference, as EU  institutions are 
also located there, one might have expected this percentage to be 
higher.  The  international  character of  the  sector, the  presence  of 
global maritime centres, and international maritime fora also has an 
impact on the choice of location. Some interest groups are attracted 14  European Political Economy Review  
 
by the  fact that London remains a key world  maritime and trade 
centre and the location of IMO (International Maritime Organisa-
tion) headquarters; therefore they prefer to operate from the UK. 
The decision of some of these interest groups (i.e., the European 
Harbour Masters Committee - EHMC) is also influenced by the fact 
that  they  represent  branches  of  international  associations  with  a 
membership broader than the EU. 
 
Table 2: Country of Secretariat’s location 
Country of Secre-
tariat’s location 
No  Interest Group  
Belgium  18 
ESPO, ECSA, ELLA, EIA, ESC, 
ETF, EMEC, EUDA, CLECAT, 
FEPORT, EUROPIA, INE, 
EURACS, EMF, AMRIE, 
OCEAN, EFIP, FEAP, 
UK 
4 Interest Groups 
3 Sub-committees of 
International Groups 
AMSI, EBA, EHMC, EURMIG,  
EURACS, EMPA IIMS (EG), 
UK /  
Office in Brussels 
1 Sub-committee of In-
ternational Group  ECASBA 
Netherlands  2  CEMT, FEMAS 
Netherlands/  
Office in Brussels  1  EBU, 
Other Country  3  EUROGIF (Scotland), CESA 
(Spain), HELCOM (Finland) 
Other Country /  
Office in Brussels  1  CRPM (France) 
 
Given  the  commuting  facilities  (Eurostar,  airplane)  these  interest 
groups are still quite close to Brussels. Counting the two interest 
groups located in the Netherlands, and those three interest groups 
which have headquarters in another country but also maintain an of-
fice in Brussels, 67% of the EU maritime interest groups are located 
in a less than two hours distance from the EU institutions headquar-
ters. The fact that 12 interest groups (36%) have relocated their sec-
retariats from another city in order to be closer to the EU institu-
tions strengthens the validity of the view (Griekingen et al 2005) 
that,  despite  the  progress  in  information  technologies,  physical 
proximity to the EU institutions and other interest groups results in 
the localisation of interest groups residence in, or nearby, ‘Europe’s 
capital’.  
 Pallis: Maritime Interest Representation  15 
All the interest groups are organised on the basis of a secretariat, the 
median size of which is 5,2 employees. Groups representing mari-
time regions tend to employ more people than other types of interest 
groups. The Conference of Peripheral Maritime Regions (CRPM) 
and  the  Baltic  Marine  Environment  Protection  Committee 
(HELCOM) have a secretariat size of 18 and 16 respectively. The 
average secretariat size of the rest of the interest groups is three or 
four  employees,  a  number  that  is  not  different  from  the one ob-
served in wider samples of EU interest groups (3-3,5 employees). 
 
The formal decision making structures of maritime interest groups 
also follow a predictable pattern of interests articulation in the EU. 
The engine houses of building policy positions are either the special 
working groups, or a number of functional policy committees. The 
presence of committees of special interests (such as shipping policy, 
transport,  social  affairs,  environment,  etc)  operate  in  the  case  of 
68,4% of the maritime interest groups (median committees number: 
3,4) and that of working groups in 57,9% (median working groups 
number: 4,2). These lower organisation tiers then report to a further 
tier of authority, the General Assembly.  
 
Regardless  the  organisational  format,  financial  resources  are  di-
rectly linked to the organisational capacity established norms of be-
haviour  based  on  sophisticated  advocacy  alliances  that  express 
clearly  defined  interests  and  monitor  day-to-day  the  regulatory 
process (Coen and Dunrether 2003). Five groups representing mari-
time interests (26%) have stated an annual budget which is in ex-
cess of 500.000 Euros. At least one of the interest groups that did 
not offer a reply to the particular question (Community of European 
Shipyards  Association-CESA)  falls  in the same  category as well. 
The majority of the maritime interest groups (approximately 40%) 
have a budget between fifty and five hundred thousand euros, and 
only one out of five groups representing maritime interests in the 
EU has a budget of less than 50.000 euros per year. 
 
All these findings suggest that the pattern of maritime interests or-
ganisation does not represent a unique sectoral case at least as re-
gards the type of Euro-groups, that have been formed by the stake-
holders, the location, the size and the internal structures of the sec-
retariats of these Euro-groups, and the resources devoted by their 16  European Political Economy Review  
 
membership. The preceding research results are in line with studies 
on the kind of organised interest in the EU that have historically 
prevailed. 
 
 
4.  Lobbying Practices  
 
The main lobbying priority of organised maritime interests is the 
European Commission (Table 3). 21% of these groups has a daily 
contact with Commission officials, 5% meets them twice a week 
and 21% once per week. Maritime policy initiatives are frequently 
very technical issues, and the Commission is a small but relatively 
open bureaucracy, not least because it depends on outside govern-
mental and non-governmental experts for the development of com-
prehensive policy proposals. It has systematically opened channels 
of access (via the MIF) and has succeeded in bringing together un-
der a common policy agenda a wide spectrum of sea-related indus-
trial, regional and social interests, which were never thought possi-
ble to be worked out together (Heretier 1999). The Directorate Gen-
erals responsible for transport (ex ‘DG VII’ renamed DG-TREN’) 
and industry (ex ‘DG III) have developed a record as a maritime 
policy innovator, notably based on the building of coalitions with 
private actors (Alexopoulos 2000; Pallis 2006).  
 
The  record  of  these  DGs  transforms  them  to  the  main  focus  of 
lobbying  activities,  particularly  DG-TREN.  However,  other  DGs 
are lobbying targets as well. When asked, interest groups mention 
more frequently the DGs dealing with the Environment, Research, 
and Enterprises, than those dealing with Competition, Employment 
and  Social  Affairs,  Enlargement,  Fisheries,  and  Regional 
development.  The  association  of  the  EU  transport  policy  with 
environmental issues, and the direct benefits of R&D are additional 
explanations as regards the former list. On the other hand, the DG-
TREN  capacity  to  identify  ‘policy  windows’  and  the  view  that 
maritime transport is a unique sector have allowed this DG to set, 
almost alone, the CMTP agenda. Issues of competition (i.e. liner 
shipping  competition,  liberalisation  of  port  services)  and 
employment  are two  cases  in  which  DG-TREN  has  assumed  the 
role  of  policy  promoter,  limiting  the  potential  of  intervention  by 
other DGs. Pallis: Maritime Interest Representation  17 
Table 3: Frequency of Contacts with EU institutions (%) 
  daily  twice per 
week  weekly  monthly  annually/  
rarely  never  n.a. 
Commission  21  5  21  37  11    5 
European Parlia-
ment  5  16  37  32  5    5 
Council Secretariat    5  5    53  32  5 
Coreper        16  47  26  11 
Ministers        16  58  21  5 
Other EU institu-
tions      16  21  32  21  11 
 
 
The European Parliament is the second locus of power intensively 
lobbied by maritime interest groups. Whilst only 5% retains a daily 
contact with MEPs, as Euro-parliamentarians spend a part of the 
week in their constituencies, 16% meets MEPs twice weekly and 
37% weekly. These practices match the frequency of the contacts 
with the Commission. Perhaps more importantly than the de jure 
power  to  co-decide  along  with  the  Council  on  which  maritime 
policies to adopt, the EP has demonstrated de facto capacities to act 
in  line with stakeholders’ preferences and reject policy proposals 
against the preferences of the Council and the Commission (it has 
done so twice in the case of the port services directive). Individual 
MEPs and the EP Transport Committee have given  informal and 
formal (i.e. public hearings) access to interests groups in order to 
understand  policy  proposals  and  build  authority.  Seemingly, 
maritime  interests  have  positively  responded,  aiming  to  iron  or 
promote the rejection of Commission initiatives.  
 
The most active maritime interest groups are those representing shi-
powners  (ECSA),  shipbuilding  (CESA),  port  authorities  (ESPO), 
the  marine  equipment  industry  (EMEC),  and  transport  workers 
(ETF). The same interest groups act as the five coordinators of all 
the working groups of the Maritime Industries Forum (MIF), a fo-
rum that has been initiated by the Commission for an efficient and 
permanent dialogue between representatives from all the industries 
concerned, trade unions, research institutes, MEPs, the Ecosoc, rep-
resentatives of national administrations, and the Commission itself 
(European Commission 1991). Representatives from the Director-18  European Political Economy Review  
 
ates General for Enterprise, and Transport and Energy, also partici-
pate in and coordinate the MIF.  
 
The Transport Council, CORPER and the Council’s secretariat are 
less focused lobbying bodies. Only 16% of interest groups contact 
Transport  Ministers  and  the  COREPER on  a  monthly  basis.  Ap-
proximately  half of the interest groups rarely  meet them, as they 
represent the last opportunity to influence a policy and are generally 
perceived as the least accessible and most secretive EU institutions. 
Besides, the Council represents national governments and it is likely 
that maritime interests try to influence this body mostly by using the 
‘national route to Brussels’ (Calingeart 1993). National associations 
might lobby  more effectively their own governments. As regards 
the Council’s secretariat, the majority of organised maritime inter-
ests maintains rare contacts (53%) or ignores this bureaucracy alto-
gether  (32%).  Only  10%  meets officials  of  this  secretariat  on  a 
weekly  basis.  This  practice  challenges  the  view that the  Council 
working groups offer remarkable scope for the articulation of dif-
ferent interests affected by European policies (Bellier 1997). 
 
As  regards  the  other  EU  institutions,  37%  of  interest  groups 
maintains a weekly or a monthly contact with at least one of them. 
The consultative Economic and Social Committee (Ecosoc) is the 
primary target, followed by the European Maritime Safety Agency, 
the  European  Environment  Agency  and  the  Committee  of  the 
Regions. Although all Commission proposals are considered by the 
Ecosoc  before  reaching  the  Council,  the  frequency  of  interest 
groups contacts with this institution is explained by the fact that this 
is an advisory body whose contribution is out of the boundaries of 
the legislative process. 
 
 
5.  Governability of Maritime Interest Groups  
 
Which factors assist and which undermine the governability of the 
preceded  maritime  interest  groups  activity?  The  secretariats  of 
groups articulating maritime interests were asked to assess 23 dif-
ferent factors, using a scale from –5 (for the most negative influ-
ence) to 5 (for the most positive influence), or judge a factor ‘irrele-
vant’. The research design was based on a literature review regard-Pallis: Maritime Interest Representation  19 
ing  interest  groups  governability  (cf.  Greenwood  2002)  and  was 
sent to all the 33 maritime interest groups for which data are avail-
able, with a response rate of  57,5% (for details: Table 1). Table 4 
illustrates the result of this scaling procedure. The set of the most 
positive factors consists of a couple scoring a positive mean reply 
over 3,0 and another two that score over 2,0. 
 
The ‘seeking of a specific regulatory regime’ is the most positive 
governability factor (mean price: 3,13). Since the operation of the 
maritime sector demands an extensive system of regulations, most 
interest groups have a membership aiming either at the stimulus, or 
the search for regulations. At the same time the EU assumes supra-
national (de)regulatory competencies at the expense of national and 
international  regulatory  bodies.  All  these  facilitate  the  work  of 
Euro-groups. The low standard deviation (1,64) is a result of the 
fact that only 7% of the participants assess this membership seeking 
as a factor having a negative impact on their work.  
 
The  second  factor  facilitating  governability  is  the  ‘presence  of  a 
European rather than a national market’ (mean price: 3). Whether 
they regard EU liberalism as part of the maritime policy problems, 
or as part of the solution of these problems, stakeholders acknowl-
edge that European integration has led to the presence of the Euro-
pean market that redefines the dimension of policy questions and 
results in a EU authority in policy development.  
 
The fact that the members of European interest groups are active 
benefit evaluators of their membership and seek added value from 
this membership, stands as the third most positive factor (mean re-
ply: 2,62). There are also some negative implications since a num-
ber of answers hint that this ‘membership benefits seeking’ might 
bring about pressures  on an interest group to ‘do what it has to do’ 
and deliver the desired policy outcome – still, only 6% assesses this 
seeking as a serious nuisance for its operation.   
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Table 4: Governability Factors 
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Specific regulatory regime 
seeking   15  -1  5  7  3,13  1,641 
The presence of a European 
rather than a national market  13  -3  5  14  3,00  2,345 
Members actively seek for the 
benefits of membership  16  -3  5  6  2,62  2,125 
The presence of a  ‘common 
enemy’  15  -2  5  14  2,12  2,186 
The presence of trust between 
members  16  -3  5  19  1,93  2,489 
Other incentives (access to 
other organisations)  13  -4  5  16  1,92  2,396 
The  degree  of  members’  spe-
cialism in the product chain   13  -3  5  16  1,84  2,444 
Autonomy of the interest group 
from its members  12  -3  5  8  1,66  2,229 
Membership density  11  0  4  9  1,63  1,911 
Degree of EU identity in global 
trade  11  -2  4  9  1,54  1,916 
Member/non-member activity 
in Brussels  12  -3  5  8  1,50  2,067 
Technology divisions  6  0  4  -  1,16  1,602 
Interest group used as the ‘sec-
ond best’ option for lobbying  11  -2  3  18  0,54  2,161 
Degree of sector’s concentra-
tion  11  -3  5  27  0,45  2,805 
Interest group used by mem-
bers just for information  14  -2  3  28  0,35  1,499 
Threat of exit by member  10  -5  4  40  0,30  2,626 
Merger and acquisition activi-
ties of your members  8  -4  3  26  0,12  2,100 
Extent of competition within 
sector  11  -4  3  36  0,00  2,144 
Presence of firms of similar 
size  8  -4  3  26  0,00  2,070 
Members are prone to lowest-
common-denominator positions  10  -3  3  40  -0,30  1,946 
Members participate just to 
avoid the costs of non-
membership 
9  -4  2  33  -0,44  1,878 
Counter-lobbying by your 
members  10  -5  2  60  -1,40  2,319 
Interest group overcapacity  6  -5  2  50  -1,66  2,401 
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The presence of a ‘common enemy’, whether these are policy actors 
as such, or (de)regulatory regimes that might affect members life, is 
the  fourth  major  facilitator  of  maritime  interest  groups  activities 
(mean price: 2,12). As interest groups members need the guidance 
of an association in order to locate the threat and to have it inter-
preted for them, Euro-groups have the ability to provide accurate in-
formation and to outline problems, an ability that enhances their co-
hesiveness. 
 
A second set of seven positive governance factors has scored an av-
erage positive assessment between 1,5–2,0. ‘Trust’ is conceived as a 
factor that  facilitates  governability  and  enhances  the  secretariat’s 
operational autonomy (mean price: 1,94). The more trusted they are 
to act and coordinate the activities and the policy position of their 
members,  the  stronger  the  EU  interest  groups  become.  Besides, 
when processing information obtained from (or for) members, these 
members place a high degree of trust in the association to protect 
potentially sensitive information (i.e. commercial practices) either 
from other policy actors, or even from other members.  
 
The importance granted to the ‘autonomy of the interest group from 
its members’ (mean price: 1,92) is in line with the view that associa-
tions need to be both resourceful and autonomous in order to define 
and sustain a course of action over the long run that is neither ex-
clusively linked to the immediate preferences of their members nor 
dependent on the  policies  partners  and  agencies  external  to their 
domain  (Smitter  1992).  Those that  acquire  some  autonomy  from 
members’ demands gain the status of a ‘policy capable organisa-
tion’ (Coleman 1988) which has the flexibility to participate in the 
daily life of EU policy-making without constantly returning to seek 
mandate. 
 
‘Specialism’ (mean price: 1,8) enables interest groups to define their 
membership boundaries and exist without having to compete with 
other groups for members. It also eases the task of finding common 
positions between members because the constituent interests have a 
degree of similarity. The result is in line with the view that without 
specialisation, associational cohesiveness is virtually impossible to 
achieve (Bennet 1998). ‘Membership density’ refers to the extent to 
which an association includes all potential members (mean price: 22  European Political Economy Review  
 
1,63). Interest groups with a high degree of membership density are 
considered authoritative and thus function better.  
 
‘Access to other organisations’ also stands as a very positive factor 
(mean price: 1,93). The EU pressures to seek IMO membership and 
to  represent  member  states  in  other  international  organisations 
might upgrade the weight of this factor in the future. To a certain 
extent, this  factor  is  linked  to  another  factor,  ‘the  degree  of  EU 
identity in global trade’ (mean price: 1,54), which is also upgraded 
as the EU membership expands. 
 
The  last  of  this  group  of  positive  factors  is  ‘members  and/non-
member  activity  in  Brussels’ (mean price: 1,50). In the  maritime 
case there are stakeholders which maintain an office in Brussels (i.e. 
Danish and Italian shipowners). However, this does not equal a di-
rect by-pass and several interest groups assess this activity as an ad-
ditional  facilitator  to  achieve  common  goals.  This  assessment  is 
largely based on the fragmented architecture of the EU institutional 
system. On the other hand, a substantial fluctuation of this factor’s 
assessment may be observed, since some interest groups feel that 
such  members’  activities  undermine  their  competencies  (see   the 
factor: ‘counter lobbying’). 
 
The research pinpointed four negative factors as regards maritime 
interest groups governability. The problem of ‘membership prone-
ness  to  lowest-common-denominator  positions’  has  been  noted 
since the very first analyses of EU interest groups (Kirchner 1981, 
Butt Philip 1985). The extent to which an interest group is subject 
to this factor effect differs, yet this issue seems to affect all interest 
groups. Some interest groups feel that they gain capacity to act due 
to this proneness, but most feel that this factor complicates the life 
of their organisation (mean price: -0,30). 
 
The fact that ‘members participate just to avoid the costs of non-
membership’ is a second negative factor (mean price: -0,44). The 
decision  of  some  national  associations,  trade  unions  or  maritime 
firms to participate in a Euro-group might not be the outcome of the 
consideration of membership benefits, but just the reflection of a 
decision to avoid the potential costs of non-membership. Such costs Pallis: Maritime Interest Representation  23 
might include the loss of the ability to have access to information 
and the limited presence in wider networks. 
 
‘Counter-lobbying’ by interest groups members stands as the sec-
ond  major  difficulty  faced  by  60%  of  Euro-groups  representing 
maritime interests (mean price: -1,40). It  should be noted that there 
is no sector in which relations between the EU and business is con-
ducted  wholly  through  a  single  associational  intermediary.  Such 
bypass activities may be justified as either the hypothetical weak-
ness of an interest group, or the consequences of the fragmented ar-
chitecture  of  the  EU  institutional  system  disposing  of  multiple 
points of access and dispersing its power so as to facilitate access to 
outside interests (Greenwood, 2002).  
 
‘Interest group overcapacity’, in other words the presence of a ‘lar-
ger than wished’ number of members, stands as the major obstacle 
to the cohesiveness of interest groups representing maritime inter-
ests (mean price: -1,66). This overcapacity is not always present (10 
groups assessed this factor as ‘irrelevant’). It might also result in the 
ability of interest groups’ secretariats to act autonomously; hence 
the observed positive replies. Still, those interest groups that face 
‘overcapacity’ claim that this factor seriously undermines their ca-
pacity to act. 
 
Three factors demand further attention, even though they scored a 
mean positive reply just above zero. This outcome is the result of a 
remarkable standard deviation of the replies. The number of interest 
groups having registered a low positive impact of the factors ‘de-
gree  of  maritime  sector’s  concentration’  and  ‘threat  of  exit  by 
members’ on their governability is greater than those that registered 
a negative one. As the second group suggests that the negative im-
pact of these factors is rather strong, the mean reply is around zero. 
As regards the third factor, there is a generalised opinion that the 
‘extent of competition within the sector’ is of  minor (negative or 
positive)  importance  for  the  governability  of  maritime  interest 
groups. Finally, the mean reply of the rest of the factors mentioned 
in the research data is in the range 0-0,5, with some of them (‘tech-
nology  divisions’,  ‘mergers  and  acquisition  activities  of  interest 
groups  members’  and  the  ‘presence  of  similar  size  firms’)  being 
judged irrelevant by half of maritime interest groups, or more.  24  European Political Economy Review  
 
6.  Conclusions 
 
Maritime interests representation stands among the variables deter-
mining CMTP discourse, outputs or failures. The EU attempt to re-
spond  to  prevailing  economic  conditions  is  a  highly  politicised 
process,  wherein  national  governments  and  EU  institutions  have 
been joined by EU-level interests groups. The knowledge regarding 
the structures of this representation is limited and even though there 
is not a dominant model of EU interest groups, the unregulated rela-
tionship between interest groups and EU institutions is dynamic and 
the capacities of interest groups to act are vital. On these grounds, 
this paper focused on the patterns of maritime interests organisation 
researching their structures, lobbying practices, and the factors that 
facilitate or impede their governability. 
 
The research identified 38 interest groups involved in EU maritime 
affairs,  the  majority  being  business  associations.  The  common 
structure observed is that of Euro-federations of national associa-
tions with a wider than EU membership, located in Brussels, having 
a secretariat of 3-4 full time employees and variable financial re-
sources at its disposal, organized on the basis of working groups 
and committees, and governed by a general assembly. The maritime 
sector hasn’t studied the structures of its EU level interests’ advo-
cacy as a unique case insofar.  
 
Concerning  the  contemporary  lobbying  practices,  the  paper  con-
cluded that in the era of co-decision, the Commission and the Euro-
pean Parliament stand as two targets of equal importance. Maritime 
interests representation focuses on those bureaucracies that have in 
practice demonstrated a capacity to determine policy developments. 
These have been the Commission’s DG-TREN and DG for Enter-
prise, and the EP Transport Committee. EU-level maritime interests 
meet Commission officials and MEPs at least once per week, but 
maintain rare contacts with the other potential locus of power in the 
EU  decision-making  process,  i.e  the  Council,  the  COREPER  (or 
any other EU institutions). 
 
As regards the governability of EU  maritime  interest groups, the 
undertaken research showed that the seeking of a specific regulatory 
regime, the development of a European market at the expense of a Pallis: Maritime Interest Representation  25 
national one, and the willingness of the members to cease the bene-
fits of their membership, stand as the three major contributors to-
wards the cohesiveness of these organisations and their potential to 
become a coherent policy actor in the making of the CMTP. On the 
other  hand,  interest  groups  overcapacity,  when  present,  counter-
lobbying by members, and the fact that in some cases members par-
ticipate in EU-level groups just to avoid the potential costs of non-
membership, stand as the three major factors undermining this ca-
pacity. Furthermore, the research identified some factors, i.e. tech-
nology divisions, which might look important enough in other sec-
tors (cf. Greenwood, 2002) but are comparatively irrelevant in the 
case of maritime interests representation.  
 
This research contributes to the identification of the structures and 
practices of the contemporary EU level interests representation. It 
also provides a step towards the appreciation of the way that the in-
fluences exerted by the environment in which they operate, help or 
undermine the capacity of EU level interest groups to effectively 
serve their members. Similar case studies as regards other sectors, 
and comparisons with the established literature might help general-
ise these findings, or identify and explain variations in the structures 
practices and governability of EU interest groups. Besides, the re-
search  on  governability  followed  an  inductive  investigation  in-
formed by interest groups secretariats. Secretariats tend to overes-
timate their capacities. They are also prone to speaking about the 
positive factors, rather than about the problems that they might face 
in representing their membership in the EU. The actual cohesive-
ness of the examined interest groups during the process of the trans-
formation of policy proposals to EU policy outcomes can  be the 
subject of further research as well. 
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